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WHAT DO YOU THINK SHOULD HAPPEN?
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Anna Triponel & Stephen Pearson*

INTRODUCTION
Transitional justice is defined by the United Nations (―UN‖)
as ―the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a
society‘s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale
past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and
achieve reconciliation.‖1 Most typically it refers to the methods by
which a state seeks to address major human rights abuses that
occurred within its borders, often after a transition from a
tyrannical regime to a democratic one.2 Instead of focusing solely
upon the accountability of individual perpetrators, as in a
traditional criminal justice system, transitional justice combines
the goals of justice for victims with the objectives of peace,
reconciliation, and social reconstruction.3
* Anna Triponel and Stephen Pearson are dual qualified attorneys (New York
and England & Wales) with the law firm of Jones Day. They head the New York
office‘s International Law Pro Bono Group which advises the Public
International Law & Policy Group (PILPG), a global pro bono firm providing
legal assistance to states and governments involved in conflicts. This includes
assistance to the Government of Uganda in the implementation of the Juba
Peace Accords and the design and implementation of domestic mechanisms to
support war crimes prosecution, truth-telling and reconciliation. The authors
would like to thank Linda Azrin, Marlena Crippin, Nicholas Kamphaus and Wei
Zhang for research assistance. The views expressed in this article are those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Jones Day or PILPG.
1 United
Nations
Rule
of
Law,
Transnational
Justice,
http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=29 (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
2 See UNITED NATIONS, WHAT IS TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE? A BACKGROUNDER
(2008),
http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/Working%20
Group%20on%20Lessons%20Learned/Justice%20in%20Times%20of%20Transitio
n%20(26.02.2008)/26.02.2008%20%20Background%20note.pdf.
3 See id.
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States often use a variety of both judicial and non-judicial
transitional justice mechanisms.4 This article will focus on three
of these methods. The first transitional justice method involves
using high court procedures against individuals who are alleged to
have committed gross violations of human rights.5 These court
procedures are aimed at judging only a nominal number of
defendants: typically those accused of particularly serious crimes.6
Examples include the International Criminal Tribunal for exYugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and
courts set up in Cambodia, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste.
The second method is the use of trial-type procedures based
on local, traditional justice mechanisms against lower-level
offenders.7 These procedures are typically integrated into the
country‘s domestic criminal system and are intended to hold
accountable those who played a part in the conflict but who did
not necessarily commit offences that rise to the level of
international crimes. Examples include the Gacaca system in
Rwanda and the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber.
The third method involves the use of truth and reconciliation
commissions (―TRCs‖) which are designed to establish a historical
record of past conflict and enhance reconciliation.8 Unlike the
first two mechanisms, TRCs are non-judicial bodies which map
patterns of past human rights abuses.9 Such bodies have been
established in a number of countries, and have been used either
4 For more information on transitional justice systems generally, see Oskar
N.T. Thoms et al., Does Transitional Justice Work? Perspectives from Empirical
Social Science (Univ. of Ottawa, Working Paper Series, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1302084; see also David E.
Guinn, Human Rights Education: The Third Leg of Post-Conflict/Transitional
Justice (Int‘l Human Rights Law Inst., Working Paper Series, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=854488.
5 See Thoms et al., supra note 4.
6 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
RULE-OF-LAW TOOLS FOR POST-CONFLICT STATES: MAXIMIZING THE LEGACY OF
HYBRID COURTS 18 (2008), http://www.unrol.org/files/Hybrid Courts.pdf
[hereinafter HYBRID COURTS].
7 See Thoms et al., supra note 4.
8 Id.
9 Human Rights Council, United Nations, Annual Report of the United
Nations High Commissioner and Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner
and the Secretary-General ¶ 8, U.N. Doc A/HRC/12/18 (Aug. 6, 2009). See
generally PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF
TRUTH COMMISSIONS (2001).
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alone or in conjunction with one or both of the two mechanisms
referenced above. In Argentina, Chile and Liberia, TRCs were the
only transitional justice methods used, whereas in Sierra Leone,
Timor-Leste and Rwanda, they have been combined with high
court or trial-type procedures.
Less frequently used transitional justice mechanisms include
lustration, which involves excluding officials who have been found
guilty of committing abuses from public service, monetary
reparations to victims of past abuses, and reform of state
institutions.10
Although the concept of transitional justice has been
recognized for more than thirty years, in recent times an
increasing number of countries are taking steps to address the
legacy of past human rights abuses within their borders, and are
resorting to transitional justice as a means of doing so. For
example, in Burundi, civil war amongst the country‘s ethnic
groups dating back to 1987 left the country ravaged.11 In 2000,
the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi
recommended the creation of a Special Tribunal, a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission and an international judicial
commission of inquiry for which a number of activities are now
being launched to raise public awareness.12 In Kenya, a Truth,
10 See Thoms et al., supra note 4; see also WHAT IS TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE?,
supra note 2, at 3-4 (defining reparation programs as ―state-sponsored initiatives
that aim to contribute to repairing, on a massive scale, the material and moral
consequences of past abuse experienced by certain classes of victims. They
typically distribute some mix of material and symbolic benefits to victims.‖
Defining security system reform as ―wide-ranging programs to transform the
military, police, judiciary, and related state institutions from instruments of
repression and corruption into instruments of public service and integrity.‖).
11 International
Center
for
Transitional
Justice,
Burundi,
http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region1/512.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010)
[hereinafter Burundi].
12 The Secretary-General, Report of the Assessment Mission On the
Establishment of an International Judicial Commission of Inquiry for Burundi,
delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc S/2005/158 (Mar. 2005) [hereinafter
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement]. See UN Will Finance Burundi
Transitional
Justice
Consultations,
http://african
newsanalysis.blogspot.com/2008/06/un-will-finance-burundi-transitional.html
(June 22, 2009, 21:13 EST); see also Burundi , supra note 11; United Nations
Development Programme, Burundi, http://www.bi.undp.org/html/demgover
nance%20-%2000062255.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2010); BBC World Service
Trust,
Communicating
Justice,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/
whatwedo/where/africa/2008/03/080219_africa_justice_project_overview.shtml
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Justice, and Reconciliation Commission was created following the
2008 National Dialogue and Reconciliation brokered by the
African Union‘s Panel of Eminent African Personalities.13 This
was prompted by the civil unrest which followed the disputed
presidential election in 2007. In Uganda, political unrest and
rebel violence in the north have threatened the country‘s stability
since the 1980‘s.14 The Uganda Government and the Lord‘s
Resistance Army in 2008 agreed on the final Annexure on
Accountability and Reconciliation which provided for the creation
of a range of transitional justice mechanisms which the
Government is now in the process of implementing.15 In Nepal,
the Government recently decided to establish a Disappearances
Commission and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
response to the civil conflict which gripped the country from 1996
to 2006.16
There is also ongoing debate regarding the possibility of
implementing transitional justice mechanisms in a number of
other states. In Sudan, thought is being given as to how to
promote sustainable peace through post-conflict reconciliation
mechanisms.17 The international community is discussing the
(last visited Jan. 27, 2010).
13 See
International Center
for Transitional Justice, Kenya,
http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region1/648.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2010)
(detailing the other transitional justice mechanisms that were created); see also
Njonjo Mue, Involve the Public in Law-Making, INT‘L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL
JUST., May 10, 2009, http://ictj.org/en/news/coverage/article/ 2608.html (indicating
that the Kenyan parliament turned down the Constitutional Amendment Bill for
a Special Tribunal for post-election violence).
14 See generally International Center for Transitional Justice, Uganda,
http://www.ictj.org/static/Africa/Uganda/ICTJ_UGA_Backgrounder_wb2008.pdf
[hereinafter Uganda].
15 SCOTT WORDEN, U.S. INST. PEACE, THE JUSTICE DILEMMA IN UGANDA 1
(2008), http://www.usip.org/files/resources/1_3.PDF; see also generally Uganda,
supra note 14.
16 See generally Nepal: Send Human Rights Bill to Parliament, H.R. WATCH,
Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/29/nepal-send-human-rightsbills-parliament [hereinafter Nepal: Human Rights Bill]; USIPIECE BRIEFING,
U.S. INST. PEACE, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN NEPAL: A LOOK AT THE INTERNATIONAL
EXPERIENCE
OF
TRUTH
COMMISSIONS
1-10
(2007),
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/transitional_justice_nepal.pdf
[hereinafter
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN NEPAL]; International Center for Transitional Justice,
Nepal, http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region3/1684.html (last visited Jan. 31,
2010).
17 CONCORDIS INTERNATIONAL, PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN SUDAN
THROUGH POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION (2007), http://www.
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possibility of implementing transitional justice mechanisms in
Zimbabwe at some point in the future,18 while in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, the international community is analyzing how
the transitional justice mechanisms which were implemented
there could have been more effective and credible.19 In recent
years, there has been interest in setting up a truth commission in
Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia,
Indonesia, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines and
Venezuela.20
One factor that is considered increasingly important in the
success of transitional justice systems is early consultation with
the population about the proposed system. The international
community now generally refers to the benefits of public
participation during the planning phase as a ―given.‖ 21
Meaningful participation involves integrating feedback received
from the public into the transitional justice mechanism, as
opposed to outreach which focuses on educating the public. For
example, in Burundi, the UN recommended that there ―be a
broad-based, genuine and transparent process of consultation . . .
with a range of national actors and civil society at large, to ensure
that, within the general legal framework for the establishment of
judicial and non-judicial accountability mechanisms acceptable to
the United Nations and the Government [of Burundi], the views
and wishes of the people of Burundi are taken into account.‖22 In
Nepal, non-governmental organizations (―NGOs‖) including
concordis-international.org/files/PCJR%20Summary.pdf.
18 See, e.g., ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM, EXPLORING TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE
OPTIONS
IN
CONTEMPORARY
ZIMBABWE
(2006),
http://www.hrforumzim.com/special_hrru/transitional_justice.pdf;
see
also
Pondai Bamu, Zimbabwe: Transitional Justice Without Transition in Zimbabwe,
ALLAFRICA.COM, Feb. 26, 2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200902 270233.html.
19 International Center for Transitional Justice, Democratic Republic of
Congo, http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region1/646.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
20 MINISTRY OF NEPAL PEACE SECRETARIAT, WORLDWIDE TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS, http://www.peace.gov.np/admin/doc/World%20
experiances%20of%20TRC-Commissions.pdf.
21 See, e.g., Transitional Justice, supra note 1 (indicating that ―[n]ational
consultations are a critical element as successful transitional justice programmes
necessitate meaningful public participation, particularly of victims.‖); UNITED
NATIONS OFFICE OF HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDANCE ON THE
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 3 (2008),
http://www.nhri.net/2009/NHRIs_Guidance %20Note%20TJ_Oct%2008.pdf.
22 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, supra note 12, ¶ 75.
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Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have urged the
government ―to involve actively all those concerned in the
discussions on the establishment, mandate, and powers of the
Disappearances Commission and the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.‖23 Furthermore, surveys conducted in countries
setting up transitional justice mechanisms, demonstrate that ―the
legitimacy of a tribunal may be intimately connected with public
perceptions of its work.‖24 In a 2004 report on the use of
transitional justice in post-conflict societies, the UN SecretaryGeneral indicated that the past decade has shown that
maintenance of peace in the long term ―cannot be achieved unless
the population is confident that redress for grievances can be
obtained through legitimate structures for the peaceful settlement
of disputes and the fair administration of justice.‖25
An analysis of public participation in the planning phases of
transitional justice mechanisms which have already been
implemented therefore provides useful guidance to states which
are currently implementing these procedures. To set the stage,
this article first tracks the evolution of transitional justice
mechanisms over the past twenty years, highlighting a gradual
increase in national involvement in the nascent stages of
transitional justice, as well as a more pronounced focus on
reconciliation (Part I). This article then discusses the emerging
trend towards promoting early public participation in transitional
justice systems.
The analysis demonstrates that public
participation during the creation of the transitional justice system
paves the way for increased public participation throughout its
period of operation (Part II). In turn, these evolutionary trends
assist in developing a nascent set of best practices, which
Nepal: Human Rights Bill, supra note 16. See also TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
supra note 16, at 1-10.
24 HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 18 (referring to ICTJ and Human Rights
Center, University of California, Berkeley, Forgotten Voices: A Population-Based
Survey on Attitudes about Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda (July 2005),
and The Post-conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and
Empowerment and ICTJ, Ex combatant Views of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and the Special Court in Sierra Leone (Sept. 2002) (indicating that
―surveys conducted in Rwanda, Uganda and Sierra Leone have illustrated a close
relationship between knowing about a court and supporting it.‖).
25 The Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 3, delivered to the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Transitional Justice Report].
23

IN NEPAL,
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countries emerging from conflict, such as Nepal, Uganda and
Kenya, can consult as they strive to achieve justice with
reconciliation (Part III).
I. THREE WAVES OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
An analysis of the transitional justice mechanisms used since
the concept was first recognized highlight three distinctive waves
of transitional justice, ranging from the 1980s (where local TRCs
were used almost exclusively), to the 1990s (where international
involvement was accentuated), to the 2000s (where transitional
justice focused increasingly on national ownership and
reconciliation).
A. The 1980s: Localized TRCs as the Single Component of
Transitional Justice
Transitional justice, as the term is understood today, emerged
in the 1980s in response to political changes in countries
throughout Latin America.26 These conflicts gave rise to the
concept of TRCs as the key component of transitional justice. For
example, in 1983, Argentinean President, Raul Alfonsín, created a
TRC - the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons
(―CONADEP‖) - to address the abuses of the successive military
juntas that had ruled Argentina since 1976.27 Similarly, Chilean
President, Patricio Aylwin, created a TRC in 1990 - the National
26 International Center for Transitional Justice, Mission and History,
http://www.ictj.org/en/about/mission/index.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010)
(indicating that ―[w]hat became known as transitional justice emerged in the
1980s and 1990s mainly in response to political changes in Latin America and
Eastern Europe -- and to demands in these regions for justice.‖).
27 Isabel Perón was deposed in a coup d‘état in Argentina in 1976 and was
replaced by a military government known as the ―National Reorganization
Process‖ (the ―Proceso de Reorganización Nacional‖). Although it is unclear
precisely when the humanitarian crisis began, the military coup sparked a
process of political subversion in which thousands of Argentineans disappeared.
It was later learned that these Argentineans were, in many cases, transferred to
secret detention centers and summarily executed by the Argentine military. In
October 1983, elections were held to restore Argentina to civilian democratic rule
and the National Reorganization Process leaders were voted out of power. For
more information, see NUNCA MÀS: THE REPORT, ARGENTINE NATIONAL
COMMISSION
ON
DISAPPEARED
(1984),
http://web.archive.org/web/20031013222855/nuncamas.org/english/library/nevag
ain/nevagain_005.htm.
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Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, also known as the
Rettig Commission – to address the human rights abuses that had
taken place in Chile at the hands of the military junta since
1973.28
The objective of these early TRCs was to document the events
that had taken place and the crimes that had been committed,
without seeking to determine responsibility.
CONADEP‘s
mandate, for example, was to investigate the disappearance of
people during a specific time frame (between 1976 and 1983).29
Similarly, the Chilean National Commission on Truth and
Reconciliation‘s aim was to develop a complete picture of human
rights violations under the Pinochet regime and recommend
appropriate legal and administrative measures to prevent future
repetition.30
B. The 1990s: Increased International Involvement
The second wave of transitional justice in the 1990s is
characterized by increased international involvement in the
establishment of transitional justice mechanisms. In Eastern
Europe and Africa, the international community intervened to set
up tribunals to judge those responsible for crimes such as
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Balkans
conflict31 led to the creation of an international criminal tribunal
28 In 1973, the military in Chile took power from President Salvador
Allende. Thereafter, the military ruled by means of a junta, dominated by
Augusto Pinochet. The junta committed numerous human rights abuses while in
power, including torture and the summary execution of political dissidents.
When the military was forced to give in to public support for democratic rule in
1990, President Aylwin was elected on a campaign promise to hold accountable
those who were responsible. See generally MARK ENSALACO, CHILE UNDER
PINOCHET: RECOVERING THE TRUTH 182-83 (2000) (discussing the history of war
and human rights in Chile).
29 Argentine
National Commission on Disappeared, Nunca Màs,
http://www.nuncamas.org/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_000.htm
(last
visited Jan. 30, 2010). See United States Institute of Peace, Truth Commission:
Argentina,
http://www.usip.org/resources/truth-commission-argentina
(last
visited Jan. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Truth Commission: Argentina].
30 Eric Brahm, The Chilean Truth and Reconciliation Commission, BEYOND
INTRACTABILITY,
July
2005,
http://www.beyondintractability.orgcase_
studies/Chilean_Truth_Commission.jsp?nid=5221.
31 In the early 1990s, several of Yugoslavia‘s regions declared independence
and fighting began along religious and ethnic lines. As the fighting intensified,
the various factions began to commit human rights violations, including torture,

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/3

8

2010] PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 111

by the United Nations Security Council - the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (―ICTY‖) - to
prosecute those responsible for gross human rights violations.32
Similarly, in the wake of the Rwandan genocide,33 the UN
Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (―ICTR‖) to prosecute individuals responsible for the
crimes committed during the genocide.34
The increased international involvement in this second wave
was also seen in the rise of TRCs whose creation was mandated by
the international community, largely through UN brokered peace
agreements. In El Salvador, the 1991 peace agreement brokered
by the UN, contained provisions creating the Commission on the
Truth for El Salvador (Comisión de la Verdad Para El Salvador,
CVES) made up of three international commissioners appointed
by the Secretary-General of the UN. 35 Guatemala also followed a
similar path. Its commission for historical clarification was
created as part of the UN brokered peace agreement of 1996. 36
mutilation, and rape, continuing from approximately the middle of 1991, until at
least the Dayton Peace Accord was signed on December 14, 1995. See generally
HOWARD BALL, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY EXPERIENCE 124-37 (1999).
32 S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
33 In October 1990, a Rwandan exile group composed mostly of ethnic Tutsis
invaded Rwanda against the Hutu government.
The war continued for
approximately two years until the government and the rebels reached a peace
accord in Arusha, Tanzania.
On April 6, 1994, the Hutu president,
Habyarimana, died when his airplane was shot down. In the next three months
(April 6, 1994 to mid-July 1994), Hutu militia groups killed up to one million
ethnic Tutsis and Hutu moderates, and another two million became refugees.
United States Department of State, Background Note: Rwanda,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2861.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
34 Bert Ingelaere, The Gacaca courts in Rwanda, in The Gacaca Traditional
Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, in Traditional Justice and
Reconciliation After Violent Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE 45 (Luc Huyse et al. eds., 2008),
available
at
http://www.idea.int/publications/traditional_justice/upload/Tradit
ional_Justice_and_Reconciliation_after_Violent_Conflict.pdf.
35 EL SALVADOR: MEXICO PEACE AGREEMENTS—PROVISIONS CREATING THE
COMMISSIONS ON TRUTH (1991), reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES, at 174-79, available at
http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/El%20Salva dorCharter.pdf; United States Institute of Peace, Truth Commission: El Salvador,
http://www.usip.org/resources/truth-commission-el-salvador (last visited Jan. 30,
2010).
36 United States Institute of Peace, Truth Commission: Guatemala,
http://www.usip.org/resources/truth-commission-guatemala (last visited Jan. 31,
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The chair of the commission was German and was selected by the
UN Secretary General. While there were two members on the
Commission who were Guatemalan, the institution was heavily
influenced by the UN and thus highly internationalized.37
C. The 21st Century: A Renewed Focus on National Ownership
and Reconciliation
The third wave of transitional justice is characterized by (i) a
renewed focus on national rather than solely international
involvement in the transitional justice process and (ii) the birth of
hybrid tribunals. Hybrid courts are ―courts of mixed composition
and jurisdiction, encompassing both national and international
aspects, usually operating within the jurisdiction where the
crimes occurred.‖38 Unlike the international ad hoc tribunals
created in the early 1990s, these new hybrid courts held trials in
their own countries, involved an increasing number of nationals
within their operations, and used both national and international
law concepts.39 This renewed focus on national ownership is
reflected in the general consensus reached by the international
community in 1998 that countries should be able to prosecute
those responsible for gross human rights abuses within their
borders under the principle of complementarity, rather than being
required to submit to an over-reaching international criminal
court.40 At the same time, a number of local TRCs aimed at
promoting reconciliation, were created to complement these
judicial proceedings.
The example of Sierra Leone demonstrates this third wave of
transitional justice. In Sierra Leone, the 1999 Lomé Accord called
for the establishment of a TRC which commenced its operations in

2010) [hereinafter Truth Commission: Guatemala]; U.S. INST. PEACE,
COMMISSION FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION: CHARTER (June 23, 1994),
http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/GuatemalaCharter.pdf.
37 See Truth Commission: Guatemala, supra note 36.
38 HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 1.
39 See Transitional Justice Report, supra note 25, at 15; HYBRID COURTS,
supra note 6, at 1.
40 See Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court art. 17, § 1(b), July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (stating that the International Criminal Court will be
able to assert jurisdiction if the country is unwilling or unable to prosecute).
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late 2002.41 Following repeated violation of the Lomé Accord by
the Revolutionary United Front, the Government of Sierra Leone
asked the United Nations to help establish a court, in addition to
the TRC, to prosecute those ―who ‗bear the greatest responsibility‘
for the commission of violations of international humanitarian
law.‖42 Unlike the ICTR and ICTY, which were established by UN
Security Council Resolutions, the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(the ―Special Court‖) was established by international agreement
between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra
Leone.43 The Special Court, which used both international and
national judges and applied both international and national law,
was a prototype for the hybrid courts that would emerge in the
future.44
Similarly, in Timor-Leste, both a TRC and a hybrid court
were set up as a means for achieving transitional justice after the
period of Indonesian control of Timor-Leste.45 In June 2000, the
See generally United States Department of State, Background Notes,
Sierra Leone (2009) http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm (discussing that
the Sierra Leone civil war started in 1991 when a small group known as the
Revolutionary United Front (―RUF‖), led by Foday Sankoh, invaded Sierra Leone
from Liberia. Except for a few short-lived cease-fires and a democratic election,
Sierra Leone was engulfed by anarchy and violence. In July 1999, a peace
agreement was reached by the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF in
Lomé, Togo (The Lomé Accord), although fighting continued until January 2002,
when President Ahmad Kabbah declared that the civil war was officially over.
The Sierra Leone TRC subsequently commenced its operation in late 2002.).
42 Joe A.D. Alie, Reconciliation and Traditional Justice: Tradition-Based
Practices of the Kpaa Mende in Sierra Leone, in TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT, LEARNING FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES
123, 132 (Luc Huyse & Mark Salter eds., 2008), available at
http://www.idea.int/publications/traditional_justice/upload/Traditional_Justice_a
nd_Reconciliation_after_Violent_Conflict.pdf.
43 Tom Perriello & Marieke Wierda, The Special Court for Sierra Leone
Under Scrutiny, in INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE,
PROSECUTIONS
CASE
STUDIES
SERIES
13
(2006),
available
at
http://www.ictj.org/static/Prosecutions/Sierra.study.pdf (indicating that these
meetings included police and prison authorities, members of the Bar
Associations, representatives of civil society, and human rights NGOs).
44 See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR ON AFRICA, DDR AND
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 33 (2007), http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/speeches/
ddr%20and%20tj%20in%20africa%20-%20english.pdf [hereinafter OSAA].
45 See generally TAINA JÄRVINEN, FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND POST-CONFLICT TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN EAST TIMOR
(2004),
available
at
http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/RESSpecNet/
19246/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/AE3FEC46-96CC-44B1-BEC5AFB8DE4332CD/en/WP47_2.pdf (discussing that nine days after Timor-Leste
41
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UN Transitional Authority for East Timor (―UNTAET‖)
established a hybrid court called the Special Panels for Serious
Crimes (the ―Special Panels‖) to prosecute the most serious
human rights violations that had taken place in Timor-Leste.46
This hybrid tribunal was formed during the creation of the overall
judicial system in Timor-Leste, with each Special Panel consisting
of one Timorese judge and two international judges.47 The law
applied by the tribunal mirrored the rules applied by the
International Criminal Court with a few exceptions.48 Within a
year, on July 13, 2001, the UNTAET also established a
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (Comissão de
Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor-Leste, ―CAVR‖)
charged with creating a mechanism for community reconciliation
procedures and drafting a final report detailing the truth about
the human rights violations that took place.49 While the TRC was
mandated by the UN, local participation was vital.
The
commission was composed of seven commissioners, all East
Timorese nationals, and twenty-five to thirty regional
commissioners located throughout the country.50 Traditional
justice mechanisms were also incorporated.51
Cambodia is also home to a hybrid tribunal, the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (―ECCC‖). In
declared its independence from Portuguese rule on November 28, 1975,
Indonesia invaded it and took control. Timor-Leste was under Indonesian rule
for approximately 25 years, and during that time, a large number of human
rights violations occurred. These violent acts reached a crescendo when TimorLeste held a referendum on self-government. The United Nations established
the United Nations Transitional Authority for East Timor (―UNTAET‖) and
immediately began to work with the Timorese to establish transitional justice
mechanisms.).
46 See UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/11, 4 (Mar. 6, 2000), available at
http://secint50.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/Reg11.pdf; see also JÄRVINEN, supra
note 45, at 48-50.
47 See UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/11, supra note 46; JÄRVINEN, supra note 45,
at 50.
48 Suzanne Katzenstein, Hybrid Tribunals: Searching for Justice in East
Timor, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 245, 245-78 (2003).
49 See EAST TIMOR COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH, AND RECONCILIATION,
CHEGA! FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION IN EAST TIMOR, pts. 2-3 (2005), available at http://www.cavrtimorleste.org/chegaFiles/finalReportEng/02-The-Mandate-of-theCommission.pdf [hereinafter CHEGA! FINAL REPORT].
50 See CHEGA! FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, intro., paras. 52-54.
51 See CHEGA! FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, pt. 9, at 2.
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1997, the Cambodian Government asked the UN to assist them in
setting up a tribunal to prosecute senior members of the Khmer
Rouge for war crimes committed in Cambodia between 1975 and
1979.52 Although the UN‘s participation was required because of
the ―weakness of the Cambodian legal system and the
international nature of the crimes,‖ the Cambodian Government
wanted to keep the process a national one and insisted that the
―trial . . . be held in Cambodia using Cambodian staff and judges
Therefore, the lengthy
together with foreign personnel.‖53
negotiations between the Cambodian Government and the UN
resulted in a hybrid court applying a mixture of local and
international law with both local and international judges and
prosecutors.54
At around the same time, the international ad hoc tribunals
set up for Rwanda and Yugoslavia, were complemented by other
transitional justice mechanisms aimed at increasing national
ownership. The Rwandan Government modernized the Gacaca
court system, a traditional grassroots dispute settlement
mechanism, to deal with genocide-related crimes.55 In addition, a
TRC - the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
(―NURC‖) - was created in 1999.56 In Yugoslavia, there was also a
push for local involvement, and in 2005, the War Crimes Chamber
Between 1975 and 1979, the Khmer Rouge, a communist party, ruled
Cambodia. During this time, the government committed gross human rights
violations, including torture, mass killings, and the plundering of villages. The
Khmer Rouge army was finally overthrown in 1979 by the neighboring
Vietnamese army. After obtaining independence from Vietnamese influence in
1991, Cambodia nominally converted to democratic rule, with the first president
being overthrown in a coup and the second president remaining in office to the
present time. Negotiations with the UN on the creation of a tribunal to put
Khmer Rouge members on trial for war crimes committed in Cambodia between
1975 and 1979 commenced in 1997 and resulted in the creation of the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) in 2003. See
generally CRAIG ETCHESON, AFTER THE KILLING FIELDS: LESSONS FROM CAMBODIAN
GENOCIDE 7-8 (2005); Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,
Introduction to the ECCC, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/ english/about_eccc.aspx (last
visited Jan. 30, 2010) [hereinafter ECCC Cambodia].
53 ECCC Cambodia, supra note 52.
54 See
International Center for Transitional Justice, Cambodia,
http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region3/642.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2010)
[hereinafter ICTJ, Cambodia].
55 Ingelaere, supra note 34, at 37 (indicating also, id. at 45, that the Gacaca
court system is the main transitional justice mechanism).
56 Id. at 45.
52
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in Bosnia and Herzegovina was created to try suspects of lower to
mid-level ranks transferred from the ICTY by the UN Security
Council.57 One of the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber‘s specific
objectives was to ―promote the process of reconciliation in Bosnia
by bringing war criminals to justice.‖58 It therefore complemented
the ICTY with trials focusing on lower-level offenders which were
fully integrated into the domestic Bosnian legal system.59
II. ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC OUTREACH MECHANISMS
Public participation in transitional justice mechanisms has
historically differed depending on the mechanism adopted. The
trend has been one of increased public outreach with each new
transitional justice wave.
A. First Wave: TRCs
The early TRCs were created by national governments
without extensive input from the public. Governments instead
relied on an implicit mandate from the people, as was the case in
Argentina and Chile.
In Argentina, President Alfonsín
campaigned on the promise to address the abuses of the
successive military juntas that had ruled since 1976.60 Alfonsín
was elected on December 10, 1983, and just three days after
assuming office, passed a law requiring the prosecution of military
leaders who had perpetrated various crimes, especially those
relating to forced disappearances.61 Two days later, Alfonsín

57 See TRIAL: Track Impunity Always, Tribunals, War Crimes Chamber in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, http://www.trial-ch.org/en/tribunals/war-crimes-chamberin-bosnia-herzegovina.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2010).
58 Id.
59 BOGDAN IVANISEVIĆ, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE,
THE WAR CRIMES CHAMBER IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: FROM HYBRID TO
DOMESTIC
COURT
(2008),
available
at
http://www.ictj.org/images/
content/1/0/1088.pdf. See also TRIAL, supra note 57.
60 See Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put
Into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619, 2622-23 (1991); see also
Juan Carlos Torre & Liliana de Riz, Argentina Since 1946, in ARGENTINA SINCE
INDEPENDENCE 342-44 (Leslie Bethell ed., 1993); Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen
Truth Commissions—1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597,
615 (1994).
61 Law No. 158, Dec. 13, 1983, [25321] B.O. (Arg.).
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passed a law establishing a truth commission, CONADEP.62
President Alfonsìn had informal consultations regarding the
establishment of a TRC with the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo
(Mothers of the Disappeared, the ―Madres‖), a large Argentinean
NGO seeking justice for the abuses committed by the previous
military governments in Argentina.63 The Madres de la Plaza de
Mayo did not support the dual system Alfonsín suggested, which
would have prosecuted high-level offenders in the national courts
and established a more far-reaching truth commission without the
power to punish. The Madres lobbied instead for a commission
with more power.64 In the end, however, this position was not
followed.
CONADEP was formed to investigate the
disappearances of people between 1976 and 1983 and to turn over
its findings to initiate formal proceedings where necessary.65 The
methods it used for fact gathering were laid out in a decree which
resulted from closed-door interviews and no public hearings.66
CONADEP‘s focus was mostly on investigation as opposed to
reconciliation, resulting in the report - ―Nunca Mas‖ (Never
Again) - detailing the facts surrounding the disappearance of
civilians in Argentina and suggesting recommendations for the
Government.67
In Chile, President Aylwin was elected on campaign pledges
to hold Augusto Pinochet‘s military regime accountable for its
human rights abuses. On April 25, 1990, after only one month in
office, Aylwin created the National Commission on Truth and
Reconciliation.68 This commission was created by executive
decree, in part to avoid a fight with the military, over which
Pinochet still had control and which wielded considerable power.69
Law No. 187, Dec. 15, 1983, [XLIV-A] A.D.L.A. 137 (Arg.).
PAUL H. LEWIS, GUERRILLAS AND GENERALS: THE ―DIRTY WAR‖ IN
ARGENTINA 204 (2002).
64 Id.
65 Truth Commission: Argentina, supra note 29.
66 NUNCA MÀS: THE REPORT, supra note 27, § IV; Law No.187, Dec. 15, 1983;
Truth Commission: Argentina, supra note 29; Nino, supra note 60, at 2623.
67 NUNCA MÀS: THE REPORT, supra note 27, § I.B.
68 See Elizabeth Lira, Human Rights in Chile: The Long Road to Truth,
Justice, and Reparations, in AFTER PINOCHET: THE CHILEAN ROAD TO DEMOCRACY
AND THE MARKET 5-6 (Silvia Borzuzky & Lois Hecht Oppenheim eds., 2006);
ENSALACO, supra note 28; Ministry of the Interior Decree No. 355, Apr. 25, 1990
(Chile).
69 ENSALACO, supra note 28, at 182-83.
62
63

15

118

PACE INT’L L. REV.

[Vol. 22:1

President Aylwin consulted with the public on the creation of this
commission, although the extent of public input is debated.70

B. Second Wave: Internationally Mandated High Courts and TRCs
International actors during the second wave of transitional
justice helped bring legitimacy to newly formed organizations and
assisted in the application of internationally recognized
standards, but in so doing, provided minimal mechanisms for
public input in the process.
1. High Courts
High courts have usually been created by the UN, either
alone or in collaboration with the concerned state. The history of
these high courts highlights that they were often established
without seeking the public‘s views on whether such a body should
be created, which is explained in part by the circumstances
surrounding their creation.
The UN Security Council unilaterally established the ICTR in
November 1994, just four months after the end of the violent
conflict in Rwanda.71 The Security Council did not consult the
Rwandan public on the establishment of the ICTR and for a
number of years after its creation, the ICTR had few outreach
programs directed towards the Rwandan public.72 As a result, the
70 Id. at 183 (claiming there was not much input outside of Aylwin‘s
advisors). But see José Zalaquett, Introduction to the English Edition, in UNITED
STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TRUTH
AND
RECONCILIATION
6
(2002),
available
at
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/collections/truth_commissions/Chile90Report/Chile90-Report.pdf (claiming that ―[d]uring the presidential campaign
the coalition of parties from the center and center-left which supported the
Aylwin candidacy set up a commission to prepare policy recommendations on
human rights. Immediately after inauguration, President Aylwin engaged in
consultations with human rights activists, relatives of victims of human rights
violations, religious leaders, and representatives from a broad range of political
parties. Defining a policy involved first establishing ultimate objectives.‖).
71 S.C. Res. 955, U.N. DOC. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). See also International
Criminal
Tribunal
for
Rwanda,
General
Information,
http://69.94.11.53/default.htm (follow ―About the Tribunal‖ hyperlink; then follow
―General Information‖ hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).
72 Mariana Goetz, The International Criminal Court and its Relevance to
Affected Communities, in COURTING CONFLICT, JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN
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victims of the Rwandan genocide had no formal venues to express
their concerns and no program was in place to inform these
victims of the trial proceedings that were being conducted.73
In similar fashion, the UN Security Council created the ICTY
unilaterally in February 1993 while hostilities were ongoing.74
The Dayton Peace Accord, which ended the conflict in Yugoslavia,
was only signed two years after the creation of the ICTY.75 As a
result, public outreach regarding these international tribunals
only started after they had been created.76
2. Internationally Mandated TRCs
TRCs during the first wave were usually created pursuant to
a peace agreement among all parties to the conflict and, similarly,
did not call for extensive public consultation.
In Guatemala, the Historical Clarification Commission,
established through a UN peace agreement, was a product of
negotiations between the Guatemalan Government, the Unidad
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca General Command, and
the UN.77 The opportunity for public input in the early phases of
TRC development was minimal as the public was not given a
choice on whether a TRC should exist and what it should look
like. This lack of public input is said to have had a negative effect
on the efficacy of the TRC. For example, while the report issued
by the commission found that 83% of the victims were Mayans,
most of the outreach programs launched by the commission were
in Spanish rather than in the indigenous languages of the
AFRICA 65 (Nicholas Waddell et al. eds., 2008).
73 Id. at 65.
74 See PIERRE HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR: THE TRUE STORY BEHIND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 7-25 (James
Thomas Snyder trans., Texas A&M Univ. Press 2004).
75 BALL, supra note 31, at 137.
76 For example, the ICTR started its first outreach program in 2000, nearly
six years after its establishment, by opening an ―info point‖ in Kigali where the
trial information is publicly accessible. The Tribunal also sought to develop a
Kinyarwanda (Rwanda‘s national language) section of its website and to
translate key decisions into Kinyarwanda. Goetz, supra note 72, at 65-66
(indicating also that these outreach programs are limited by their voluntary
financing and perceived status as non-core functions of the ICTR).
77 Conciliation Resources, Commission for Historical Clarification Accord,
http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/guatemala/historical-clarification. php (last
visited Jan. 30, 2010).
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Mayans.78
El Salvador‘s truth commission was also established through
a UN brokered peace agreement. The TRC was administered and
funded by UN member states and was charged with investigating
―serious acts of violence that occurred since 1980 whose impact on
society urgently demands that the public . . . know the truth.‖79
The lack of public discussions in establishing the TRC added to its
lack of credibility, and five days after the TRC issued its report
and recommendations, the Government granted a blanket
amnesty covering the violent events taking place in this period.80
C. Third Wave: Hybrid Courts, Traditional Justice and TRCs
The third wave of transitional justice witnessed a shift
towards increased national ownership of the transitional justice
mechanisms used, with continued reliance on international
standards of justice. The focus shifted from high courts to hybrid
court and traditional justice systems, and from internationally
influenced TRCs to more locally dominated ones.
1. Hybrid Courts
Similar to the high courts that were created during the
second wave of transitional justice, the first created hybrid
tribunals lacked public participation mechanisms. In TimorLeste, the UNTAET created the Special Panels on June 6, 2000
without consulting the public.81 One NGO, the Judicial System
78 Justice
in Perspective, Commission for Historical Clarification,
http://www.justiceinperspective.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie
w&id=67&Itemid=142 (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).
79 De la Locura a La Esperanza: La Guerra de 12 Años en El Salvador,
http://www.fundacionpdh.org/lesahumanidad/informes/elsalvador/informe-de-lalocura-a-la-esperanza.htm; Commission for Historical Clarification, supra note
78.
80 Justice in Perspective, Commission on the Truth for El Salvador,
http://www.justiceinperspective.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie
w&id=65&Itemid=111 (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).
81 U.N.
Transitional Administration for East Timor, U.N. DOC.
UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (June 6, 2000). See HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 10
(where the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
states that ―virtually no consultation with local legal actors or the public
preceded the decisions to insert international actors into the domestic legal
system reflected in . . . UNTAET Regulation N° 2000/15‖); see also Suzannah
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Monitoring Programme, provided some public information
regarding the Special Panels, but a system for soliciting feedback
from the general population was not provided for from the
outset.82
The general transition to hybrid tribunals which occurred at
the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, was
accompanied by a gradual shift in thinking. During the 2000‘s,
the UN demonstrated an increased readiness to consult with the
public in a specified state before determining the exact contours of
the post-conflict justice system to be adopted in that state. The
ability to gather public input also became simpler because courts
were no longer being established while conflict was raging. In
Sierra Leone, a peace agreement was signed on July 7, 1999,
followed by a UN planning mission which held meetings with
representatives of civil society and human rights NGOs on
January 7-19, 2002, resulting in the signature of the agreement
In
establishing the Special Court on January 16, 2002.83
Cambodia, the UN also held consultations with civil society
groups while it was negotiating with the Cambodian Government
on the structure of the court to be established.84
Although these public consultations are to be commended,
their actual impact on the creation and format of these courts has
been questioned. For example, in Sierra Leone, the negotiations
to establish the Special Court for Sierra Leone included mainly
Government actors led by the Attorney-General and the Minister
of Justice.85 Many national groups felt ignored,86 leading the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights to conclude that ―the lack
of involvement of Sierra Leonean legal professionals more broadly
Linton, Rising From the Ashes: The Creation of a Viable Criminal Justice System
in East Timor, 15 MELB. U. L. REV. 122 (2001).
82 HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 19 (indicating also that in ―Timor-Leste,
the Special Panels similarly did not initially engage in any form of public
outreach or even dissemination of basic information, in contrast to the Serious
Crimes Unit.‖).
83 Perriello & Wierda, supra note 43, at 17 (indicating that these meetings
included police and prison authorities, members of the Bar Associations,
representatives of civil society, and human rights NGOs).
84 KELLI MUDDELL, THE ASIA SOCIETY, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN CAMBODIA:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 6-7 (2003), http://www.ictj.org/ static/
Asia/Cambodia/cambodiasymposium.eng.pdf.
85 HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 11.
86 Perriello & Wierda, supra note 43, at 13.
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and the failure to keep them adequately informed of progress
meant that, firstly, lawyers felt disengaged from the process and,
secondly, a lack of information led to misplaced hopes and
expectations.‖87 Similarly, in Cambodia, civil society groups
complained that the UN consultations tended to be limited to
educational sessions, and that no system for obtaining feedback
from these groups was put into place.88
Rather than seeking feedback on whether and how a hybrid
court should be created, establishers of these courts have most
commonly focused on educating the public about the relevant
court. In Cambodia, spokespeople for the court gave interviews to
the press about how the court would work and, in conjunction
with the Documentation Center of Cambodia (the ―DC-Cam‖), the
court invited villagers from throughout Cambodia to visit the
court and learn about its workings.89 The UN also kept civil
society groups informed of the status of the negotiations regarding
the creation of the court through regular meetings with
representatives from various groups.90
There have also been more targeted efforts to educate local
leaders and ex-combatants on the premise that these sub-groups
will in turn help to educate the public at large. In Sierra Leone,
one national NGO, the Special Court Working Group, had a
consistent presence on local radio and educated local leaders
about the Special Court.91 Another national NGO, the PostConflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and
Empowerment, in coordination with the International Center for
Transitional Justice (the ―ICTJ‖), conducted surveys and
HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 11.
MUDDELL, supra note 84.
89 See Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Outreach &
Media, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/outreach.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).
These activities continued once the judges were selected and the court began
preliminary operations. DC-Cam worked closely with the ECCC to help further
the truth telling and reconciliation goals of the special tribunal. The DC-Cam
distributed monthly journals, free of charge, with trial updates and other
relevant articles. See Peter Bartu & Neil Wilford, DDR and Transitional Justice:
Cambodia Case Study, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE,
http://ictj.org/en/research/projects/ddr/country-cases/ 2378.html.
90 MUDDELL, supra note 84, at 7-11 (indicating also that Cambodian NGOs
complained however that their involvement was limited to receiving information
and would have liked to play a larger role in the court‘s creation).
91 Perriello & Wierda, supra note 43, at 35.
87
88
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organized sensitization and focus group sessions with excombatants to educate them about the transitional justice
systems.92 These sensitization sessions were said to have greatly
increased the ex-combatants‘ support for the Special Court and
their willingness to cooperate with this court.93 National NGOs
led most of the educational efforts before the Special Court was
established because local groups were concerned about animosity
or retaliation from the ex-combatants.94 The Special Court‘s
official outreach program, however, did not start until more than
six months after the court started its operations.95
2. Traditional Justice Systems
Traditional justice systems are increasingly viewed as an
integral mechanism through which transitional justice can take
place. Rwanda has established a full transitional justice system
based on a traditional justice mechanism, the Gacaca system.
Timor-Leste incorporated aspects of traditional justice into its
community reconciliation procedures and the Bosnian War
Crimes Chamber is a traditional justice system integrated into
the local court system.
In Rwanda public participation was vital to the success of the
Gacaca system. Public input was sought at every step of the
process, and the feedback was used to improve and streamline the
final traditional justice system seen in the country now. Before
the Gacaca courts were adopted as a nation-wide traditional
justice mechanism, local researchers and professors in Rwanda
had demonstrated that the Gacaca courts were being used in some
areas immediately after the genocide, initiated either by the local
people or the local authorities.96 The findings of this research
were discussed in a 1996 report by the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights (the ―UNHCHR‖) which recommended the use of
92 POST-CONFLICT
REINTEGRATION INITIATIVE FOR DEVELOPMENT &
EMPOWERMENT, EX-COMBATANT VIEWS OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION AND THE SPECIAL COURT IN SIERRA LEONE 36-39 (2002),
http://www.ictj.org/images/content/0/9/090.pdf [hereinafter PRIDE]. Perriello &
Wierda, supra note 43, at 36.
93 PRIDE, supra note 92, at 16-17.
94 Perriello & Wierda, supra note 43, at 35.
95 Id. at 36-37 (discussing the outreach efforts by the Special Court).
96 Ingelaere, supra note 34.
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Gacaca to deal with genocide-related crimes.97 Between May 1998
and March 1999, the then-Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu
held weekly discussions (the Urugwiro Meetings) with
representatives of Rwandan society about serious social issues,
including the genocide-related crimes and the possible use of
Gacaca.98 The participants of the Urugwiro Meetings included
members of the government, state institutions, the military,
Participation by civil
political parties, and the judiciary.99
societies was limited however, as the only groups whose opinions
were sought were victims‘ associations.100
Following these
meetings, the government officially proposed to modernize and
formalize the traditional Gacaca system to address the large
number of prisoners.101 The use of Gacaca as a prong of the
country‘s transitional justice system was thus discussed with
certain members of the public before its official adoption.
The Government of Rwanda gave the public a large role in the
selection of which people would implement the traditional justice
system. Indeed, in keeping with accepted custom regarding the
Gacaca courts, the judges are elected from among the local
population over which they have jurisdiction. Thus judges at the
―Cell‖ level, Rwanda‘s lowest administrative level, are elected by
the General Assembly of the Cell, which is made up of all Cell
residents over eighteen years of age.102 Judges at the ―Sector‖
level, which comprises a larger area, are elected by the
representative members of each Cell found within that particular
Sector.103 The judges are elected based on their ―integrity.‖104
Additionally, during the information collection phase of the
Id. at 36.
Id. at 37. At that time, there were approximately 130,000 prisoners being
held for genocide-related crimes and the Rwandan court system was
overwhelmed. Id.
99 Id. at 46.
100 Id.
101 Ingelaere, supra note 34, at 37.
102 Organic Law No. 16/2004, arts. 13, 6 (June 19, 2004) (Rwanda), available
at
http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/pdf/newlaw1.pdf
(establishing
the
Organization, Competence and Functioning of Gacaca Courts Charged with
Prosecuting and Trying the Perpetrators of the Crime of Genocide and Other
Crimes Against Humanity, Committed Between October 1, 1990 and December
31, 1994).
103 Id. arts. 13, 7.
104 Ingelaere, supra note 34, at 46.
97
98
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Gacaca process, which is held at the Cell level, residents of the
Cell may offer information relating to an accused perpetrator.105
The judge will consider such inform-ation in determining the
―category‖ of the perpetrator‘s crimes.106
The Government of Rwanda also sought to improve the
transitional justice system through pilot programs and building
on public feedback prior to its full-scale implementation. In 2002,
the Government conducted pilot Gacaca courts in 751 localities,
approximately three years before the new Gacaca court system
was implemented nationwide, finding that several modifications
to the new Gacaca court system were advisable during that
process.107
In Timor-Leste, a smaller scale grass roots traditional justice
mechanism, the Community Reconciliation Process (the ―CRP‖),
was launched with the aim of promoting reconciliation among
affected communities.108 The aim of the CRP was to ―reintegrate
people who had become estranged from their communities by
committing politically-related, ‗less serious‘ harmful acts during
the political conflicts in Timor-Leste.‖109 The CRPs mandate was
to facilitate community-based hearings where the community
would participate directly in finding a way to reintegrate the
perpetrators into the community. The hearings were voluntary
and were led by a panel of local leaders in the community affected
by the acts of the perpetrator. At the conclusion of the hearings,
the panel would broker an agreement with the perpetrator to
return to the community in exchange for the perpetrator‘s promise
to provide community service or other similar tasks.110 While CRP
provided for the basic structure of these community hearings, this
105 Id.
at 42; see also National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions,
http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/En/EnStructure.htm.
106 Ingelaere, supra note 34, at 42. Gacaca courts place offenders in one of
three categories based on their alleged violations.
Gacaca courts have
jurisdiction over categories two and three, but offenders falling within the first
category must be tried by ordinary courts. The first category includes the most
heinous and high profile actors, and their accomplices. See Organic Law No.
16/2004, arts. 2, 51 (June 19, 2004) (Rwanda).
107 Ingelaere, supra note 34, at 38-42.
108 East Timor Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, The
Community Reconciliation Process, http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/en/recon
ciliation.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).
109 Id.
110 Id.
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structure was flexible, allowing each jurisdiction to vary the
proceedings as they saw fit.111
3. Nationally Mandated TRCs
During the third wave of transitional justice, the public came
to play an increasingly large role in the establishment of TRCs,
and, in particular, in deciding whether a TRC should be created
and how such a body should operate. Indeed, governments have
to a greater degree encouraged the public to be involved in
drafting the legislation establishing the TRC, which includes
determining the composition and operation of the commission. In
addition, the local population can play a role in raising funds and
promoting outreach to expatriates. The experiences of TimorLeste, Peru, Sierra Leone, and Liberia are pertinent examples of
this shift in the establishment of TRCs and illustrate how
national and international NGOs work together to contribute to
the process.
a. Timor Leste
Timor-Leste included NGOs in the entire CAVR planning
process. The Government of Timor-Leste, supported by UNTAET,
held a meeting in June 2000 to discuss transitional justice,
including whether a truth commission should be established.112
The meeting included various civil society groups, community
leaders, and the Catholic Church.113
It resulted in a
recommendation to the National Council of Timorese Resistance
to create an independent commission that would have ―a mandate
to investigate past violations and promote reconciliation.‖114 This
Council acted upon the recommendation quickly and created a
―steering committee‖ which was to determine the details of the
TRC.115
The steering committee in charge of determining what the
Id.
East Timor Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation,
Formation of the Commission, http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/en/cavr.htm
[hereinafter Formation of the Commission].
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
111
112
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TRC would look like included representatives of various national
and international NGOs.116 The steering committee conducted
consultations in all thirteen districts of Timor-Leste from
September 2000 through January 2001.
These included
consultations with political parties, jurists, human rights
organizations and victims‘ groups to assess the public‘s views on
what such a body should look like, as well as public meetings at
the district, sub-district, and village levels.117 The consultations
had a built-in educational and feedback system enabling the
steering committee to describe the type of institution the TRC
would be while allowing the community members to provide
feedback.118 Additionally, the CAVR solicited community leaders
to endorse the procedures and incorporated small elements of
traditional ceremony into the procedures to enhance acceptance of
this mechanism by the community leaders.119
b. Peru
In Peru, the legislation creating the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, the ―CVR‖),
was drafted by a working group composed of representatives from
the government and civil society, including the ministries of
justice, defense, interior, women‘s issues and human development,
the human rights ombudsman‘s office, the National Human
Rights Coordination, the Peruvian Episcopal Conference and the
National Evangelical Council of Peru.120 The Commission worked
116 National NGOs included women‘s groups, youth organizations, the
Catholic Church, the Association of ex-Political Prisoners, Falintil (the group
that would become the army of Timor-Leste), while international NGOs included
the UNTAET, and the UN High Commissioner on Refugees. Id.
117 Formation of the Commission, supra note 112.
118 Id. This focus on education continued after the establishment of the TRC
as well. To educate the public about the truth and reconciliation process and to
assist in the public‘s education about community reconciliation procedures,
CAVR distributed video CDs as it toured the districts of Timor-Leste and
conducted its operations. PIERS PIGOU, THE COMMUNITY RECONCILIATION PROCESS
OF THE COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH, AND RECONCILIATION 17, 22 (2004),
http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/Analysis/Laporan Piers tentangCRP.pdf.
119 Id. at 30-31.
120 Sup. Res. No. 314-2000-JUS, Feb. 27, 2001 (Peru), translation available at
http://190.41.250.173/rij/bases/legisla/peru/304-2000.html; WORLDWIDE TRUTH
AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS, MINISTRY OF NEPAL PEACE SECRETARIAT,
http://www.peace.gov.np/admin/doc/World%20exper
iances%20of%20TRC-
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with the International Center for Transitional Justice which
allowed for consultation with other TRCs around the world in
order to gather input on design, methodology and other similar
details.121
c. Sierra Leone
In Sierra Leone, various civil society groups were involved in
the creation and establishment of a TRC.122 The civil society
groups involved in peace negotiations advocated for the
establishment of a TRC and worked with the Office of the
UNHCHR on preliminary issues regarding the TRC‘s
establishment.123 Civil society also reviewed the draft terms for
the TRC‘s statute prepared by the office of the UNHCHR.124
A Truth and Reconciliation Commission Working Group was
subsequently established to make recommendations on the
composition of the TRC.125 This resulted in a transparent process
as the public nominated sixty-five commissioner candidates.126 A
selection panel then made recommendations to a selection
coordinator who recommended four of the finalists for
appointment to the TRC. 127 Sierra Leoneans living abroad were
Commissions.pdf.
121 International
Center
for
Transitional
Justice:
Peru,
http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region2/617.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2010). This
consultation with the public continued after the initial formation of the TRC. To
implement the recommendations of the TRC, the government created a National
Council for Reconciliation which relied heavily on input from civil society.
Outreach was crucial to the commission and they worked at gathering
information throughout the country by setting up five regional offices throughout
Peru. The CVR also sought to educate the public and made sure their final
report and recommendations were made publicly and were widely distributed.
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE TRUTH
AND
RECONCILIATION
COMMITTEE
OF
PERU
(2003),
http://www.ictj.org/static/Americas/Peru/TRC.FinalReport.eng.pdf
[hereinafter
PERU TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION REPORT].
122 SIERRA LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, THE FINAL REPORT
OF THE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SIERRA LEONE: SETTING UP THE
COMMISSION
1,
49-77
(2007),
http://www.sierra-leone.org/OtherConflict/TRCVolume1.pdf [hereinafter SETTING UP THE COMMISSION].
123 OSAA, supra note 44, at 37; SETTING UP THE COMMISSION, supra note 122,
at 49-77.
124 SETTING UP THE COMMISSION, supra note 122, at 49-77.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
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also included in the process and were able to nominate the
commissioners for that state‘s TRC.128 Public input in the design
of the TRC and in the selection of its commissioners allowed for
increased national ownership of the institution, while still relying
on international groups such as the ICTJ, for assistance in
technical and other matters.129 Thus, the institution was given
credibility not only for being a product of national civil society, but
also for adhering to international standards.
Education was also made a high priority. The commission
provided a grant to the International Human Rights Law Group
and other NGOs to establish a public education and awareness
campaign before the establishment of the TRC.130 This campaign
used radio, television, songs, drama, and posters to educate the
public, and it also relied on civil society groups to carry out the
campaign.131 Other NGOs also conducted public education on the
TRC with independent funding.132
Furthermore, public
workshops and conferences were held with strong civil society
engagement prior to the inception of the TRC.133
d. Liberia
In Liberia,134 the Transitional Justice Working Group (the
Id.
International Center for Transitional Justice, Sierra Leone,
http://www.ictj.org/ en/where/region1/141.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2010).
130 SETTING UP THE COMMISSION, supra note 122, at 49-77.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Ambassador, EU Presidency Statement - The Role of Civil Society in PostConflict Peace-Building, delivered by Ambassador Richard Ryan to the Security
Council
(June
22,
2004),
available
at
http://www.euun.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_3605_fr.htm
[hereinafter
EU
Presidency
Statement].
134 The Liberian civil war was initiated in 1989 by the National Patriotic
Front of Liberia (NPFL), an armed group led by Charles Taylor, challenging
then-President Samuel Doe. In 1990, a break-away faction from Taylor‘s NPFL
captured and killed Doe and an interim Government of National Unity was
formed, headed by Dr. Amos Sawyer. In 1992, Taylor finally agreed to the
formation of a transitional government. Taylor was elected President of Liberia
after a special election in 1997. Between 1989 and 1996, more than 200,000
Liberians lost their lives and a million others became refugees. The conflict in
Liberia continued until 2003, when President Taylor resigned and accepted an
asylum offer from Nigeria. A comprehensive peace agreement (the Accra Peace
Agreement) was reached by the Liberian government, the rebels, political
128
129
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―TJWG‖), a coalition of NGOs, worked closely with the UN
Mission in Liberia and the ICTJ to provide input on the creation
of the TRC.135 The act creating the TRC allowed the public,
including those abroad, to nominate TRC commissioners, subject
to a further vetting process by a selection panel.136 In 2005, the
Liberian public nominated over 150 candidates for the TRC
commissioners.137 The selection panel screened the 150 nominees
and shortened the candidate list to fifteen.138 The commission
also conducted a Nationwide Needs Assessment in May 2006 and
later launched a Nationwide Outreach and Sensitization
Campaign to introduce itself to the public prior to its launch.139
The Liberian TRC commissioners conducted extensive public
outreach within Liberia and amongst the Liberian community
world-wide, calling for widespread participation from all members
and former members of the society.140
During the months prior to launching the TRC, the Liberian
civil society, international NGOs, and the TRC commissioners
conducted extensive educational campaigns.141
The TJWG
parties, and civil society in 2003 in Accra, Ghana. For more information, see
United
States
Department
of
State,
Background
Note:
Liberia,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6618.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2010);
International
Center
for
Transitional
Justice,
Liberia,
http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region1/589.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2010); the
full
text
of
the
Peace
Agreement
is
available
at
http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/liberia_0818
2003.pdf; United States Institute of Peace, Liberia, http://www.usip.org/
resources/truth-commission-liberia (last visited Sept. 8, 2009).
135 Liberia Launches Truth and Reconciliation Commission, INTERNATIONAL
CENTER
FOR
TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE,
June
22,
2006,
http://www.ictj.org/en/news/features/961.html
[hereinafter
Liberia,
INTERNATIONAL CENTER].
136 AMNESTY INT‘L, LIBERIA: TRUTH, JUSTICE AND REPARATION: MEMORANDUM
ON
TRUTH
AND
RECONCILIATION
ACT
26
(June
21,
2006),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR34/005/2006/en/3205abe5-d41f11dd-8743-d305bea2b2c7/afr340052006en.pdf [hereinafter LIBERIA: TRUTH,
JUSTICE AND REPARATION].
137 Id. at 27.
138 Id.
139 Massa A. Washington, Chairman, Truth and Reconciliation Commissioner
of Liberia Commission on Diaspora Relations, Remarks at the Official Launching
of the TRC-US Diaspora Statement Taking Process, available at
https://www.trcofliberia.org/news-1/trc-happenings/remaks-at-the-officiallaunching-of-the-trc-us-diaspora-statement-taking-process.
140 Liberia, INTERNATIONAL CENTER, supra note 135.
141 LIBERIA: TRUTH, JUSTICE AND REPARATION, supra note 136, at 30-31.
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conducted a public education and awareness campaign, including
meetings in four Liberian counties to obtain public feedback on
the TRC.142 In May 2006, the TJWG and ICTJ organized a
consultation session to outline the role of civil society groups in
the truth and reconciliation process.143 Approximately fifty civil
society representatives from all counties in Liberia attended this
session.144 The ICTJ also helped organize workshops to train the
local media groups about the TRC.145
III. EMERGING BEST PRACTICE
The foregoing analysis of the creation of transitional justice
mechanisms demonstrates that, when determining the types of
mechanisms to use and procedures to follow, states have
increasingly found it advisable to engage in direct communication
with the public at the outset. Such public outreach during the
planning phase can be beneficial in multiple ways.
First,
feedback received from the public can assist the state in creating a
transitional justice system that better responds to local needs.
The success of the Gacaca system in Rwanda, for example, is due
in part to its responsiveness to public feedback before its
nationwide launch. Second, input from the public can assist in
creating a fairer system, taking into account the many actors and
perspectives involved in the conflict. This in turn will help
increase the chances of successful reconciliation.146 Third, the
public is more likely to support a transitional justice system if it is
familiar with the system and was instrumental in its creation.147
Id. at 30
Liberia, INTERNATIONAL CENTER, supra note 135.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 See, e.g., Anna F. Triponel, Can the Iraqi Special Tribunal Further
Reconciliation in Iraq?, 15 CARDOZO J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 277 (2007)
(demonstrating that reconciliation is not achieved when transitional justice is
viewed as one-sided).
147 See, e.g., id.; LOUIS AUCOIN & EILEEN F. BABBITT, UNITED NATIONS
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, STRATEGIC GUIDELINES FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
ACTIVITIES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (2007), http://www.undp.org.rs/
index.cfm?event=public.getFile&fileid=06FC4932-3FF2-8C752EA1D3F9F50CDCBC; African Transitional Justice Research Network, ATJRN
Capacity
Building
Workshops,
http://www.transitionaljustice.org.za/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=466&Itemid=40 (last visited Feb.
13, 2010).
142
143
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Conversely, if the public is not consulted, this can lead to lack of
integrity, as with the Sierra Leone High Court where it was
believed that many misperceptions and resentments ―could easily
have been prevented if there had been more consultation from the
outset.‖148
At the same time, public participation in a country emerging
from conflict on issues as sensitive as torture, disappearances and
mass murder is difficult. There is a need to address conflict
expeditiously while at the same time ensure feedback from the
most representative group possible. The evolution of practices
over the three waves of transitional justice illustrates the key
factors which should be considered when incorporating public
participation in the planning phases of transitional justice.
A. Consulted Issues
Depending on the particular transitional justice system
implemented, the government or the UN may consult with the
public on a range of issues. For example, the public could be
asked whether the particular transitional justice mechanism
proposed should be adopted. This has happened in connection
with a number of the recently formed TRCs, such as in Sierra
Leone and Liberia.
The public can also be asked to provide input in drafting the
implementing legislation for the transitional justice mechanisms.
This includes determining the personnel and procedures for such
mechanisms.
In addition, the government can encourage
individual citizens or non-governmental organizations to generate
support among the general population for the mechanism,
including raising funds. The government can also seek to educate
the public, keep the public abreast of the latest developments
regarding the implementation of the transitional justice
mechanism, and convey what the government hopes to achieve.
Experience demonstrates that when civil society is present at
the beginning of the process, it will generally remain involved
throughout the process. For example, in Liberia, the TJWG,
representing various groups in civil society, was involved in
making the decision as to whether transitional justice
mechanisms were needed and subsequently provided input on the
148

HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 11.
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drafting of the TRC act, planning for the TRC‘s operations, and
selecting TRC commissioners. 149
B. Meaningful Participation
The UNHCHR has commented on the need for meaningful
participation, indicating that ―effective outreach should involve‖
four elements:150 first, ―[a] proactive strategy that seeks to target
different sectors of the population (women‘s groups,
schoolchildren, the legal profession, the security sector, private
business, etc.);‖151 second, ―[a] comprehensive approach that
focuses not just on the prosecutor, who will always attract much
public attention at the beginning of the proceedings, but on all
parts of the trial process, including the right to a fair trial and
competent defence, this should include the provision and
dissemination of preliminary basic information as early as
possible[];‖152 third, ―[a] network that is able to disseminate
accurate information quickly over a wide geographic area;‖153 and
fourth, ―[g]enuine, two-way communication that involves dialogue
and opportunities for feedback.‖154
The evolution of transitional justice mechanisms in the past
three decades demonstrate that, when determining the best
strategy for meaningful public participation, there are three key
questions to be resolved: who, how and when?
1. Who: Consulting Representative Groups
Public participation is rendered meaningless if the people
who participate are not sufficiently representative of the local
population.155 The modalities for seeking true representation will
149 Id., see also AMNESTY INT‘L, LIBERIA: TOWARDS THE FINAL PHASE OF THE
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 1-36 (2008), available at http://www.
amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR34/002/2008/en/f98485d1-571e-11dd-90ebff4596860802/afr340022008eng.pdf.
150 HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 20.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 11 (indicating that ―[i]ntimately connected with the question of
ownership is that of identifying interlocutors. The range of interlocutors with
whom the international community seeks to engage during the negotiation on
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vary depending on the country and conflict. Nevertheless, a
number of trends have emerged as best practice.
First, when high courts or hybrid courts are created by the
UN, the UN‘s in-country planning missions should focus on
ensuring ownership of the process by the national government.
For example, the ICTJ recommends ―that the mission team ha[ve]
a specific national liaison identified from within the government
of the potential host country with whom to ensure effective
coordination.‖156 The planning mission should address ―[t]he
presence and organisational capacity of civil society, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), both national and
international, and human rights groups.‖157 The Office of the
UNHCHR recommends ―clear assessment of the national capacity,
with the participation of human resource experts‖ and that these
assessments teams ―not only be led by a UN actor with detailed
knowledge of the country but also include national legal actors.‖158
Key players to involve during this planning mission include
relevant ministries as well as civil society.159
Second, there is a need to focus on the sectors of society that
were particularly affected by the conflict. This includes not only
the victims of the conflict but also the perpetrators. For example,
in Sierra Leone, child soldiers were both victims and perpetrators
of violations, and their views on how to best achieve justice and
reconciliation were considered particularly important.160 This was
the formation of a hybrid court plays an important role in securing buy-in from
stakeholders in civil society and the legal community. As a result, this range
should be wide and include major stakeholders.‖). For example, in Nepal, NGOs
including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch urged the
government of Nepal ―to involve actively all those concerned in the discussions
on the establishment, mandate, and powers of the Disappearances Commission
and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.‖ Nepal: Human Rights Bill,
supra note 16.
156 ROBIN VINCENT, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, AN
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES MANUAL FOR INTERNATIONALLY ASSISTED CRIMINAL
JUSTICE INSTITUTIONS 4 (2007), http://www.ictj.org/images/content/9/3/931. pdf.
157 Id. at 5.
158 HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 9.
159 VINCENT, supra note 157, at 6.
160 NATALIE MANN AND BERT THEUERMANN, UNICEF, CHILDREN AND THE
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR SIERRA LEONE: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR INVOLVING
CHILDREN IN THE TRC 1 (2001), http://www.unrol.org/files/TruthandRecon
ciliationSierraLeone.pdf (stating that in Sierra Leone, ―[c]hildren‘s experiences
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taken into account in the TRC act which called ―on the TRC to
give special attention to the experiences of children within the
armed conflict . . . and, to this end, to consider implementing
special procedures to address the needs of children who have been
victims, or perpetrators of violations . . . .‖161 Another example is
Sierra Leone, where surveys of ex-combatants were organized by
a national NGO in coordination with the ICTJ.162
Third, national civil society should be encouraged to convey
the views of locals on the ground. If the national NGO is intended
to reflect views from a specific part of the population, then a
number of NGOs representing different parts of the populace
should be consulted. If the national NGO purports to represent
views of the community as a whole, the mechanisms they employ
to speak in the name of the population should be explored.
International civil society can also play a role, especially with
regard to sharing expertise regarding public participation
mechanisms that have been successful in other countries.
Fourth, professionals with specific expertise should be
targeted. These can include members of the legal community,
human rights campaigners, and other specific professions.
However, while the 2002 UN planning missions in Sierra Leone
included representatives of civil society and human rights NGOs,
the national groups still felt left out.
This experience
demonstrates the difficulty of ensuring that all constituents feel
involved in the process.
Fifth, to ensure true representation, different regional
viewpoints should also be taken into account. The atrocities will
not have had the same impact in all parts of the country. For
example, in Liberia, meetings took place in four Liberian counties
to obtain the public‘s feedback on the TRC, and civil society
representatives from all the counties in Liberia attended a
consultation session to outline the role of civil society groups in

should form an integral part throughout the TRC process - from the preparatory
phase and the undertaking of preliminary background research to the final
report and the establishment of a follow-up committee.‖).
161 Id. (stating that in Sierra Leone, ―[c]hildren‘s experiences should form an
integral part throughout the TRC process - from the preparatory phase and the
undertaking of preliminary background research to the final report and the
establishment of a follow-up committee.‖).
162 PRIDE, supra note 92, at 36-39; Perriello & Wierda, supra note 43, at 36.
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the truth and reconciliation process.163 In Peru, the CVR set up
five regional offices to promote participation from affected groups
throughout the country.164 Several TRCs have also focused efforts
on including expatriates in the reconciliation process.
2. How: Methods of Participation
In the past, either the UN or the government has
spearheaded the public participation process, depending on who is
the primary entity responsible for its creation. In addition, before
it actually starts its operations, the court or TRC in question can
be responsible for obtaining feedback from the public.165 The
government can also train other actors to play a role, such as local
media or local NGOs, which has the added benefit of enhancing
national ownership.
a. Transparency
It is important that consultations with the public be
transparent and that the process be made public. For example,
the establishment of the TRC in Sierra Leone was deemed by the
international community to be a transparent process.166
b. Education
Recent trends in the establishment of both TRCs and
tribunals show education as a fundamental element of outreach.
For example, for criminal trials to play an important role in
transitioning societies, former UN Secretary General commented
that they must ―giv[e] [victims] a chance to see their former
tormentors made to answer for their crimes.‖167 In Cambodia,

LIBERIA: TRUTH, JUSTICE AND REPARATION, supra note 136, at 30.
PERU TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 121.
165 HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 19 (―While NGOs can play a crucial role
in amplifying awareness and encouraging debate about hybrid courts, this
should not in turn justify a reduction of the hybrid court‘s own responsibility for
outreach. Outreach needs to be complemented by public information and by a
trained media adviser and spokesperson. Public information offices of hybrid
tribunals can contribute to building the capacity and legal literacy of local media,
including through working with NGOs.‖).
166 EU Presidency Statement, supra note 134.
167 Transitional Justice Report, supra note 25.
163
164
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DC-CAM played a key role in involving and educating the public
about the trials. Furthermore, organizations such as ICTJ have
engaged in the capacity of building among local organizations, to
allow them to better monitor the proceedings and distribute the
information.168 In Sierra-Leone, there was an attempt to educate
local leaders and ex-combatants in hopes that they would spread
information and also increase their willingness to cooperate with
the courts.169
In Timor-Leste, before the CAVR was established, a steering
committee underwent various consultations throughout the
country to determine what kind of TRC would be best suited to
the needs of the people.170 These consultations incorporated an
educational and feedback mechanism, whereby the public being
consulted would learn about the various TRC mechanisms and
provide feedback as to what their community felt was
necessary.171 Both Sierra Leone and Liberia also launched
education and public awareness campaigns prior to the
establishment of their TRCs.172
Educating the public allows not only for a mode of cultivating
public feedback, but also provides a way to nationalize the process
of reconciliation. If transitional justice mechanisms are viewed as
having been imposed from the outside, their effectiveness to
create change will be diminished.
c. Feedback Mechanisms
The example of Cambodia, where civil society groups
complained that the UN consultations tended to be limited to
educational sessions, demonstrates the importance of feedback
mechanisms to take into account the public‘s concerns and
comments.173 There are many different ways for obtaining
feedback from the population on specific questions, including
surveys of victims, group discussions, workshops, and through
soliciting written submissions. Educational campaigns to educate
ICTJ, Cambodia, supra note 54.
Perriello & Wierde, supra note 43; PRIDE, supra note 92.
170 CHEGA! FINAL REPORT, supra note 49.
171 Id.
172 See SETTING UP THE COMMISSION, supra note 122; LIBERIA: TRUTH, JUSTICE
AND REPARATION, supra note 136.
173 MUDDELL, supra note 84, at 6-7.
168
169
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the public in parallel can include radio, television, songs, drama
and posters, as was done in Sierra Leone.174 Past practices
demonstrate that one way to obtain feedback from a number of
groups is by creating a specific working group whose mandate is
to provide input into the work of the transitional justice
mechanism. In Liberia, NGOs came together to create the TJWG
to provide input on the creation of the TRC175 while in Sierra
Leone, NGOs established a TRC Working Group that made
recommendations on the composition of the Commission.176
d. Public Funding
In most cases, transitional justice mechanisms have been
funded either by the state that created them or, if the mechanism
was created internationally, by a number of foreign contributors.
Allowing the public to assist in the funding of these mechanisms,
however, could increase the sense among the public that the
institution is their own, rather than a system imposed from the
outside. For example, the act establishing the TRC in Liberia
allowed the TRC to be financed by different sources including
individual Liberians and non-Liberians, as well as international
non-governmental organizations.177
3. When: Providing for Timely Input
Meaningful participation also means providing sufficient time
for the public to provide feedback. This is very closely linked with
the feedback mechanisms and can have serious effects on
nationalizing the transitional justice process. If processes such as
surveys or educational consultations are in place, the public
should be given enough time to respond, and those in charge of
collecting this input should be given significant time to analyze
and incorporate the results.
Many countries have employed working groups whose
mandate it is to gather and analyze public input before the
creation of a TRC. Implicit in this mandate is that these

174
175
176
177

SETTING UP THE COMMISSION, supra note 122.
Liberia, INTERNATIONAL CENTER, supra note 135.
SETTING UP THE COMMISSION, supra note 122.
LIBERIA: TRUTH, JUSTICE AND REPARATION, supra note 136, at 31-32.
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consultations will help inform the working group‘s decisions as to
the makeup or structure of the TRC. It is important that enough
time be given to the working group. In Timor Leste, the working
group was given five months, enabling it to gather information
from each of its thirteen districts, as well as sub-districts and
villages.178 In Peru, the working group had three months and was
composed of a large cross section of civil society in order to obtain
well rounded input in creating its TRC.179
C. Varying Consultation Depending on the Transitional Justice
Mechanism
This analysis of the degree of public participation in the
varying transitional justice mechanisms highlights that the
nature of the public consultation depends on the type of
transitional justice system being implemented. Consultations
regarding the early high courts tended to be limited to educational
sessions, while hybrid tribunals have come to rely more on public
input with regards to the design of the tribunal. TRCs have also
increased their reliance on public input, including on the question
of whether a TRC should be created at all.
These differences in the nature of the consultation process
can be explained by a number of factors. TRC‘s aim is first and
foremost to promote national reconciliation and to establish a
balanced picture of the conflict. A TRC may not be appropriate for
every transition and this is a decision that should belong to those
who have lived through the conflict.180
The international
community may assist in providing information and expertise
based on other TRCs but cannot force such decisions.181 Trials on
the other hand seek to achieve justice which, to a certain degree,
should be achieved whether or not all nationals agree. The
CHEGA! FINAL REPORT, supra note 49.
Sup. Res. No. 304-2000-JUS, Dec. 9, 2000 (Peru), translation available at
http://190.41.250.173/rij/bases/legisla/peru/304-2000.html.
180 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
RULE-OF-LAW TOOLS FOR POST-CONFLICT STATES: TRUTH COMMISSIONS 5 (2006),
available at http://www.unrol.org/files/ruleoflaw-TruthCommissions_ en.pdf
[hereinafter TRUTH COMMISSIONS].
181 Id. (indicating that ―International actors . . . should recognize from the
start that a country may choose, for very legitimate reasons, not to have a truth
commission or at least not to have one immediately upon transition. National
views on this matter should be respected.‖).
178
179
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resemblance of hybrid tribunals to domestic criminal proceedings
for which public participation does not play a part, explains in
part why, during the initial hybrid tribunals, public participation
has not always been seen as crucial.182 In addition, although the
design of court systems varies, there are a number of procedural
and substantive similarities among tribunals.183 This is not true
however of TRCs which should be unique to each conflict.184
Indeed, the Office of the UNHCHR has emphasized that ―[u]nlike
courts, for which there are clear international norms regarding
their appropriate structure, components, powers and minimal
standards for proceedings, truth commissions will reasonably
differ between countries in many aspects.‖185
Today, however, it is increasingly clear that when a hybrid
tribunal is created, consultation with the local population in
addition to negotiations with the government is required to
achieve an appropriate balance between the national and
international elements of the tribunal. The populace should feel
that the tribunal belongs to them, with an international presence,
rather than being imposed from the outside.186 This public
consultation at the outset can help avoid misunderstandings and
assess the importance of particular factors for the population. For
example, the Government of Sierra Leone amended the
implementing legislation for the court to appoint international
staff instead of nationals to some of the key posts in the court,
which led to the view that the court was more international than
national.187 In addition, because the population is not involved in
182 HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 19 (―In part, this [lack of consultation]
has been due to a general reluctance, including on the part of legal professionals
within hybrid tribunals, to view the trial processes of hybrid courts as inherently
different from domestic criminal proceedings.‖).
183 See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994);
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(May 25, 1993); Rome Statute, supra note 40.
184 TRUTH COMMISSIONS, supra note 180, at 5-6.
185 Id. at 1.
186 HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 9 (―By definition, hybrid approaches
require investment from both international and national organizations,
Governments, victim organizations, legal communities, and civil society. Ideally,
all those involved ought to feel vested in the process.‖).
187 Id. at 11 (―In the Special Court, the percentage of Sierra Leonean staff
overall is greater; however, very few Sierra Leoneans are in positions of
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the operation of a tribunal to the same degree as they are in a
TRC, it is especially important that a mechanism be put in place
at the outset to consult with the public. Tribunals often tackle
complex international criminal law issues that are difficult for the
public to understand. This problem is exacerbated in countries
with low literacy levels.188 As such, outreach during the creation
of hybrid tribunals will help introduce the public to the workings
of the tribunal and involve victims and other stakeholders.189 The
Iraqi Special Tribunal is an example of a tribunal that was viewed
as somewhat biased and, accordingly, did not fulfill its potential
relating to reconciliation.190
In addition, unlike the early high court tribunals, such as the
ICTR and ICTY that were located outside of the country in
transition,191 many hybrid courts now insist that the tribunal be
established within the country. This was seen in the ECCC and
the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone which were both set up
within the national borders of the transitioning country. The UN
Secretary General has commented that ―there are a number of
important benefits to locating tribunals inside the countries
concerned, including easier interaction with the local population,
closer proximity to the evidence and witnesses and being more
accessible to victims.‖192
As such, establishing transitional
mechanisms locally, including hybrid courts, has emerged as good
practice.
CONCLUSION
This

article

demonstrates

that

the

public

outreach

authority or participate in high-level decision-making.‖).
188 Id. at 19.
189 Id. at 18-19 (―Outreach [during the creation of hybrid tribunals] may be
the main way of involving victims and other stakeholders, who may not
otherwise be able to participate more formally in the trials. A hybrid court may
be seen as largely irrelevant unless there is a robust outreach programme that
informs the public about its activities.‖).
190 Triponel, supra note 146.
191 For the ICTY, see Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph
2 of Security Council Resolution 808, S.C. Res. 820, 3200th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/820
(Apr.
17,
1993),
available
at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f21b10.html; for the ICTR, see S.C. Res.
977, 3502d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/977 (Feb. 22, 1995), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f1564f.html.
192 Transitional Justice Report, supra note 25.
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mechanisms used by a country and the UN during the
establishment of a transitional justice system will depend on the
specific circumstances of each country. Nevertheless, early and
comprehensive public outreach is increasingly viewed as crucial in
helping the state achieve its objective of creating a successful
transitional justice system inclusive of all perspectives of the
conflict and accepted by the population at large. The need to
obtain public feedback at the outset is especially important in
view of the current trend towards the establishment of hybrid
courts with increased national elements and national TRCs
focused on reconciliation.
The experience of various transitioning countries throughout
the first, second, and third waves provides a lesson to those
countries who now find themselves in similar circumstances.
Experience shows that in designing a transitional justice system
that incorporates feedback from the public, the system ultimately
has a better chance of achieving its aim of justice for victims,
while reinforcing the possibility of peace, reconciliation, and social
reconstruction. Countries now emerging from a conflict could
learn from the experience of countries before them.
Integrating public input into a transitional justice system will
have major benefits for the country as a whole and the converse is
also true.
Kenya‘s recent creation of the Truth, Justice,
Reconciliation Committee (―TJRC‖) highlights this point. When
the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights was consulted
regarding setting up the TJRC, the short timelines set for
consultation did not enable this commission to consult properly
with its constituencies.193
In addition, the Bill on Special
Tribunals appeared in that country‘s Gazette for two weeks of
public debate after discussions between the Ministry of Justice
and the Attorney-General, by which time, changes were
unlikely.194 Kenya‘s experience accordingly demonstrates that
―meaningful public input must take place before the tabling of
Bills in Parliament, and that a special duty is imposed upon
government to ensure that this happens.‖195 The head of the
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights has, for example,
stated that ―public participation improves lawmaking while giving
193
194
195

Mue, supra note 13.
Id.
Id.
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citizens a stake in it. By inviting participation, lawmakers not
only gather important information on which to make better laws,
they also express their respect for the citizens whom they consult.
In turn, those consulted become more engaged and responsible in
public life.‖196
Although the initial burden is on the organization and state
that are creating the transitional justice mechanism, the local
population plays a key role in ensuring true representation. Civil
society should view this as an opportunity to organize. In Nepal,
for instance, in order to provide for meaningful public
participation, the ICTJ and Advocacy Forum (―AF‖) conducted a
survey of victims from seventeen regions in Nepal, followed by
focus-group discussions regarding the possible implementation of
a TRC. This resulted in the recommendation from the ICTJ and
AF that ―an official joint task force on transitional justice
comprising representatives from the government, civil society,
National Human Rights Commission, victims, and the UN‖ be
created to ―conduct broad-based national consultations on the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and to gather stakeholders‘
views on the Commission‘s mandate, powers, goals, and
timeframe.‖197
Lessons extracted from the three waves of transitional justice
are not only useful for the countries emerging from conflict, but
also for those who have established transitional justice
mechanisms without adequate public consultation. Mechanisms
that were historically put in place without initial public
participation are now focusing on incorporating consultation
programs. For example, in Rwanda, the Rwandan Government
did not appear to have consulted with the public about the
creation of the NURC, but since its commencement, the NURC
has conducted extensive outreach programs. These programs
include meetings, conferences, workshops, consultations, and
sensitization campaigns on the theme of unity and
reconciliation.198
The Rwandan Government organized the
Id.
See INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, NEPALI VOICES:
PERCEPTIONS OF TRUTH, JUSTICE, RECONCILIATION, REPARATIONS AND THE
TRANSITION IN NEPAL 14 (2008), http://www.ictj.org/images/content/8/3/830 . pdf.
198 Eugenia Zorbas, Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 1 AFR. J. LEGAL
STUD.
29,
38
(2004),
available
at
http://www.africalawinstitute.org/ajls/vol1/no1/zorbas.pdf. For information about
196
197
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Ingando solidarity camps for reintegration and re-education.199 It
also held a number of national summits which both current and
expatriate Rwandans attended.200 Similarly, the Bosnia War
Crimes Chamber and the Rwandan Gacaca system were both
mechanisms used to take ownership of their transitional justice
systems and to build on shortcomings of their respective ad hoc
tribunals.
When the public is involved in the threshold question as to
whether a particular court or commission should be created at all,
it is easier to secure the public‘s participation in the subsequent
design and operation of the system that is adopted. Although this
article focuses on public participation at the outset, participation
does not, and should not, end with the creation of the transitional
justice mechanism. Ownership should be viewed as a continuum
and activities promoting both participation and education should
be conducted throughout a tribunal‘s existence. Only through
meaningful public participation and ownership of the various
transitional justice mechanisms available will the goal of
reconciliation be truly felt.

the outreach programs initiated by NURC since its inception, see generally
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, http://www.nurc.gov.rw/;
INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION, EVALUATION AND IMPACT
ASSESSMENT OF THE OF THE NATIONAL UNITY AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
(2005),
available
at
http://www.nurc.gov.rw/
documents/researches/Impact_assessment_of_NURC_Sammary.pdf [hereinafter
EVALUATION AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT]. For general discussions about the
outreach programs initiated by NURC since its inception, see the NURC website,
http://www.nurc.gov.rw/; Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Evaluation and
Impact Assessment of the NURC, http://www. nurc. gov.rw [hereinafter NURC
Assessment].
199 See Zobras, supra note 199; EVALUATION AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra
note 198, at 38-39. For general discussions about the outreach programs
initiated by NURC since its inception, see the NURC website,
http://www.nurc.gov.rw/; NURC Assessment, supra note 198.
200 EVALUATION AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 198, at 38.
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